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Islam and the
Theology of Power
"Supremacist puritanism in
contemporary Islam is dismissive of all moral norms or ethical values."
By Khaled Abou El Fadl, UCLA School of Law.
Since the early 1980s,
commentators have argued that Islam is suffering a crisis of identity, as the
crumbling of Islamic civilization in the modern age has left Muslims with a
profound sense of alienation and injury. Challenges confronting Muslim nations
-- failures of development projects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and the
inability to respond effectively to Israeli belligerence -- have induced
deep-seated frustration and anger that, in turn, contributed to the rise of
fundamentalist movements, or as most commentators have preferred to say,
political Islam. But most commentators have been caught off guard by the
ferocity of the acts of mass murder recently committed in New York and
Washington. The basic cruelty and moral depravity of these attacks came as a
shock not only to non-Muslims, but to Muslims as well.
The extreme political violence we
call terrorism is not a simple aberration unrelated to the political dynamics of
a society. Generally, terrorism is the quintessential crime of those who feel
powerless seeking to undermine the perceived power of a targeted group. Like
many crimes of power, terrorism is also a hate crime, for it relies on a
polarized rhetoric of belligerence toward a particular group that is demonized
to the point of being denied any moral worth. To recruit and communicate
effectively, this rhetoric of belligerence needs to tap into and exploit an
already radicalized discourse with the expectation of resonating with the social
and political frustrations of a people. If acts of terrorism find little
resonance within a society, such acts and their ideological defenders are
marginalized. But if these acts do find a degree of resonance, terrorism becomes
incrementally more acute and severe, and its ideological justifications become
progressively more radical.
Asking Why
To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US symptomatic of more
pervasive ideological undercurrents in the Muslim world today? Obviously, not
all social or political frustrations lead to the use of violence. While national
liberation movements often resort to violence, the recent attacks are set apart
from such movements. The perpetrators did not seem to be acting on behalf of an
ethnic group or nation. They presented no specific territorial claims or
political agenda, and were not keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One
can speculate that the perpetrators' list of grievances included persistent
Israeli abuses of Palestinians, near-daily bombings of Iraq and the presence of
American troops in the Gulf, but the fact remains that the attacks were not
followed by a list of demands or even a set of articulated goals. The attacks
exhibit a profound sense of frustration and extreme despair, rather than a
struggle to achieve clear-cut objectives.
Some commentators have viewed the
underpinnings of the recent attacks as part of a "clash of
civilizations" between Western values and Islamic culture. According to
these commentators, the issue is not religious fundamentalism or political
Islam, but an essential conflict between competing visions of morality and
ethics. From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that the terrorists do
not present concrete demands, do not have specific territorial objectives and do
not rush to take responsibility. The September 11 attacks aimed to strike at the
symbols of Western civilization, and to challenge its perceived hegemony, in the
hope of empowering and reinvigorating Islamic civilization.
The "clash of
civilizations" approach assumes, in deeply prejudiced fashion, that
puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic expressions of the predominant
values of the Islamic tradition, and hence is a dangerous interpretation of the
present moment. But the common responses to this interpretation, focusing on
either the crisis of identity or acute social frustration in the Muslim world,
do not adequately explain the theological positions adopted by radical Islamist
groups, or how extreme violence can be legitimated in the modern age. Further,
none of these perspectives engage the classical tradition in Islamic thought
regarding the employment of political violence, and how contemporary Muslims
reconstruct the classical tradition. How might the classical or contemporary
doctrines of Islamic theology contribute to the use of terrorism by modern
Islamic movements?
Classical
Islamic Law and Political Violence
By the eleventh century, Muslim jurists
had developed a sophisticated discourse on the proper limits on the conduct of
warfare, political violence and terrorism. The Qur'an exhorted Muslims in
general terms to perform jihad by waging war against their enemies. The Qur'anic
prescriptions simply call upon Muslims to fight in the way of God, establish
justice and refrain from exceeding the limits of justice in fighting their
enemies. Muslim jurists, reflecting their historical circumstances and context,
tended to divide the world into three conceptual categories: the abode of Islam,
the abode of war and the abode of peace or non-belligerence. These were not
clear or precise categories, but generally they connoted territories belonging
to Muslims, territories belonging to enemies and territories considered neutral
or non-hostile for one reason or another. But Muslim jurists could not agree on
exactly how to define the abode of Muslims versus the abode of others,
especially when sectarian divisions within Islam were involved, and when dealing
with conquered Muslim territories or territories where sizable Muslim minorities
resided.(1) Furthermore, Muslim jurists disagreed on the legal cause for
fighting non-Muslims. Some contended that non-Muslims are to be fought because
they are infidels, while the majority argued that non-Muslims should be fought
only if they pose a danger to Muslims. The majority of early jurists argued that
a treaty of non-aggression between Muslims and non-Muslims ought to be limited
to a ten-year term. Nonetheless, after the tenth century an increasing number of
jurists argued that such treaties could be renewed indefinitely, or be of
permanent or indefinite duration.(2)
Importantly, Muslim jurists did
not focus on the idea of just cause for war. Other than emphasizing that if
Muslim territory is attacked, Muslims must fight back, the jurists seemed to
relegate the decision to make war or peace to political authorities. There is a
considerable body of legal writing prohibiting Muslim rulers from violating
treaties, indulging in treachery or attacking an enemy without first giving
notice, but the literature on the conditions that warrant a jihad is sparse. It
is not that the classical jurists believed that war is always justified or
appropriate; rather, they seemed to assume that the decision to wage war is
fundamentally political. However, the methods of war were the subject of a
substantial jurisprudential discourse.
Building upon the proscriptions of
the Prophet Muhammad ,
Muslim jurists insisted that there are legal restrictions upon the conduct of
war. In general, Muslim armies may not kill women, children, seniors, hermits,
pacifists, peasants or slaves unless they are combatants. Vegetation and
property may not be destroyed, water holes may not be poisoned, and
flame-throwers may not be used unless out of necessity, and even then only to a
limited extent. Torture, mutilation and murder of hostages were forbidden under
all circumstances. Importantly, the classical jurists reached these
determinations not simply as a matter of textual interpretation, but as moral or
ethical assertions. The classical jurists spoke from the vantage point of a
moral civilization, in other words, from a perspective that betrayed a strong
sense of confidence in the normative message of Islam. In contrast to their
pragmatism regarding whether a war should be waged, the classical jurists
accepted the necessity of moral constraints upon the way war is conducted.
An Offense
Against God and Society
Muslim jurists exhibited a remarkable tolerance toward the idea of political
rebellion. Because of historical circumstances in the first three centuries of
Islam, Muslim jurists, in principle, prohibited rebellions even against unjust
rulers. At the same time, they refused to give the government unfettered
discretion against rebels. The classical jurists argued that the law of God
prohibited the execution of rebels or needless destruction or confiscation of
their property. Rebels should not be tortured or even imprisoned if they take an
oath promising to abandon their rebellion. Most importantly, according to the
majority point of view, rebellion, for a plausible cause, is not a sin or moral
infraction, but merely a political wrong because of the chaos and civil strife
that result. This approach effectively made political rebellion a civil, and not
a religious, infraction.
The classical juristic approach to
terrorism was quite different. Since the very first century of Islam, Muslims
suffered from extremist theologies that not only rejected the political
institutions of the Islamic empire, but also refused to concede legitimacy to
the juristic class. Although not organized in a church or a single institutional
structure, the juristic class in Islam had clear and distinctive insignia of
investiture. They attended particular colleges, received training in a
particular methodology of juristic inquiry, and developed a specialized
technical language, the mastery of which became the gateway to inclusion.
Significantly, the juristic class
engaged as a rule in discussion and debate. On each point of law, there are ten
different opinions and a considerable amount of debate among the various legal
schools of thought. Various puritan theological movements in Islamic history
resolutely rejected this juristic tradition, which reveled in indeterminacy. The
hallmark of these puritan movements was an intolerant theology displaying
extreme hostility not only to non-Muslims but also to Muslims who belonged to
different schools of thought or even remained neutral. These movements
considered opponents and indifferent Muslims to have exited the fold of Islam,
and therefore legitimate targets of violence. These groups' preferred methods of
violence were stealth attacks and the dissemination of terror in the general
population.
Muslim jurists reacted sharply to
these groups, considering them enemies of humankind. They were designated as
muharibs (literally, those who fight society). A muharib was defined as someone
who attacks defenseless victims by stealth, and spreads terror in society. They
were not to be given quarter or refuge by anyone or at any place. In fact,
Muslim jurists argued that any Muslim or non-Muslim territory sheltering such a
group is hostile territory that may be attacked by the mainstream Islamic
forces. Although the classical jurists agreed on the definition of a muharib,
they disagreed about which types of criminal acts should be considered crimes of
terror. Many jurists classified rape, armed robbery, assassinations, arson and
murder by poisoning as crimes of terror and argued that such crimes must be
punished vigorously regardless of the motivations of the criminal. Most
importantly, these doctrines were asserted as religious imperatives. Regardless
of the desired goals or ideological justifications, the terrorizing of the
defenseless was recognized as a moral wrong and an offense against society and
God.
Demise of the
Classical Tradition
It is often stated that terrorism is
the weapon of the weak. Notably, classical juristic discourse was developed when
Islamic civilization was supreme, and this supremacy was reflected in the
benevolent attitude of the juristic class. Pre-modern Muslim juristic discourses
navigated a course between principled thinking and real-life pragmatic concerns
and demands. Ultimately, these jurists spoke with a sense of urgency, but not
desperation. Power and political supremacy were not their sole pursuits.
Much has changed in the modern
age. Islamic civilization has crumbled, and the traditional institutions that
once sustained the juristic discourse have all but vanished. The moral
foundations that once mapped out Islamic law and theology have disintegrated,
leaving an unsettling vacuum. More to the point, the juristic discourses on
tolerance towards rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no longer
part of the normative categories of contemporary Muslims. Contemporary Muslim
discourses either give lip service to the classical doctrines without a sense of
commitment or ignore and neglect them all together.
There are many factors that
contributed to this modern reality. Among the pertinent factors is the
undeniably traumatic experience of colonialism, which dismantled the traditional
institutions of civil society. The emergence of highly centralized, despotic and
often corrupt governments, and the nationalization of the institutions of
religious learning undermined the mediating role of jurists in Muslim societies.
Nearly all charitable religious endowments became state-controlled entities, and
Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations became salaried state employees,
effectively transforming them into what may be called "court priests."
The establishment of the state of Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinians and
the persistent military conflicts in which Arab states suffered heavy losses all
contributed to a widespread siege mentality and a highly polarized and
belligerent political discourse. Perhaps most importantly, Western cultural
symbols, modes of production and social values aggressively penetrated the
Muslim world, seriously challenging inherited values and practices, and adding
to a profound sense of alienation.
Two developments became
particularly relevant to the withering away of Islamic jurisprudence. Most
Muslim nations experienced the wholesale borrowing of civil law concepts.
Instead of the dialectical and indeterminate methodology of traditional Islamic
jurisprudence, Muslim nations opted for more centralized and often code-based
systems of law. Even Muslim modernists who attempted to reform Islamic
jurisprudence were heavily influenced by the civil law system, and sought to
resist the fluidity of Islamic law and increase its unitary and centralized
character. Not only were the concepts of law heavily influenced by the European
legal tradition, the ideologies of resistance employed by Muslims were laden
with Third World notions of national liberation and self-determination. For
instance, modern nationalistic thought exercised a greater influence on the
resistance ideologies of Muslim and Arab national liberation movements than
anything in the Islamic tradition. The Islamic tradition was reconstructed to
fit Third World nationalistic ideologies of anti-colonialism and
anti-imperialism rather than the other way around.
While national liberation
movements -- such as the Palestinian or Algerian resistance -- resorted to
guerrilla or non-conventional warfare, modern day terrorism of the variety
promoted by Osama bin Laden is rooted in a different ideological paradigm. There
is little doubt that organizations such as the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir
and Jama'at al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and
anti-colonialist ideologies, but they have anchored themselves in a theology
that can be described as puritan, supremacist and thoroughly opportunistic. This
theology is the byproduct of the emergence and eventual dominance of Wahhabism,
Salafism and apologetic discourses in modern Islam.
Contemporary
Puritan Islam
The foundations of Wahhabi theology
were put in place by the eighteenth-century evangelist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab
in the Arabian Peninsula. With a puritanical zeal, 'Abd al-Wahhab sought to rid
Islam of corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion. Wahhabism
resisted the indeterminacy of the modern age by escaping to a strict literalism
in which the text became the sole source of legitimacy. In this context,
Wahhabism exhibited extreme hostility to intellectualism, mysticism and any
sectarian divisions within Islam. The Wahhabi creed also considered any form of
moral thought that was not entirely dependent on the text as a form of
self-idolatry, and treated humanistic fields of knowledge, especially
philosophy, as "the sciences of the devil." According to the Wahhabi
creed, it was imperative to return to a presumed pristine, simple and
straightforward Islam, which could be entirely reclaimed by literal
implementation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strict adherence to
correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any attempt to
interpret the divine law from a historical, contextual perspective, and treated
the vast majority of Islamic history as a corruption of the true and authentic
Islam. The classical jurisprudential tradition was considered at best to be mere
sophistry. Wahhabism became very intolerant of the long-established Islamic
practice of considering a variety of schools of thought to be equally orthodox.
Orthodoxy was narrowly defined, and 'Abd al-Wahhab himself was fond of creating
long lists of beliefs and acts which he considered hypocritical, the adoption or
commission of which immediately rendered a Muslim an unbeliever.
In the late eighteenth century,
the Al Sa'ud family united with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against
Ottoman rule in Arabia. Egyptian forces quashed this rebellion in 1818.
Nevertheless, Wahhabi ideology was resuscitated in the early twentieth century
under the leadership of 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud who allied himself with the
tribes of Najd, in the beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi
rebellions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very bloody because
the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized Muslims and non-Muslims
alike. Mainstream jurists writing at the time, such as the Hanafi Ibn 'Abidin
and the Maliki al-Sawi, described the Wahhabis as a fanatic fringe group.(3)
Wahhabism
Ascendant
Nevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived in contemporary Islam for
several reasons. By treating Muslim Ottoman rule as a foreign occupying power,
Wahhabism set a powerful precedent for notions of Arab self-determination and
autonomy. In advocating a return to the pristine and pure origins of Islam,
Wahhabism rejected the cumulative weight of historical baggage. This idea was
intuitively liberating for Muslim reformers since it meant the rebirth of
ijtihad, or the return to de novo examination and determination of legal issues
unencumbered by the accretions of precedents and inherited doctrines. Most
importantly, the discovery and exploitation of oil provided Saudi Arabia with
high liquidity. Especially after 1975, with the sharp rise in oil prices, Saudi
Arabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi thought around the Muslim world. Even a
cursory examination of predominant ideas and practices reveals the widespread
influence of Wahhabi thought on the Muslim world today.
But Wahhabism did not spread in
the modern Muslim world under its own banner. Even the term "Wahhabism"
is considered derogatory by its adherents, since Wahhabis prefer to see
themselves as the representatives of Islamic orthodoxy. To them, Wahhabism is
not a school of thought within Islam, but is Islam. The fact that Wahhabism
rejected a label gave it a diffuse quality, making many of its doctrines and
methodologies eminently transferable. Wahhabi thought exercised its greatest
influence not under its own label, but under the rubric of Salafism. In their
literature, Wahhabi clerics have consistently described themselves as Salafis,
and not Wahhabis.
Beset with
Contradictions
Salafism is a creed founded in the late
nineteenth century by Muslim reformers such as Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Afghani and
Rashid Rida. Salafism appealed to a very basic concept in Islam: Muslims ought
to follow the precedent of the Prophet and his companions (al-salaf al-salih).
Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical to Wahhabism except that
Wahhabism is far less tolerant of diversity and differences of opinion. The
founders of Salafism maintained that on all issues Muslims ought to return to
the Qur'an and the sunna (precedent) of the Prophet. In doing so, Muslims ought
to reinterpret the original sources in light of modern needs and demands,
without being slavishly bound to the interpretations of earlier Muslim
generations.
As originally conceived, Salafism
was not necessarily anti-intellectual, but like Wahhabism, it did tend to be
uninterested in history. By emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the
adherents of Salafism idealized the time of the Prophet and his companions, and
ignored or demonized the balance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic
precedents and undervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of egalitarianism
that deconstructed any notions of established authority within Islam.
Effectively, anyone was considered qualified to return to the original sources
and speak for the divine will. By liberating Muslims from the tradition of the
jurists, Salafism contributed to a real vacuum of authority in contemporary
Islam. Importantly, Salafism was founded by Muslim nationalists who were eager
to read the values of modernism into the original sources of Islam. Hence,
Salafism was not necessarily anti-Western. In fact, its founders strove to
project contemporary institutions such as democracy, constitutions or socialism
into the foundational texts, and to justify the modern nation-state within
Islam.
The liberal age of Salafism came
to an end in the 1960s. After 1975, Wahhabism was able to rid itself of its
extreme intolerance, and proceeded to coopt Salafism until the two became
practically indistinguishable. Both theologies imagined a golden age within
Islam, entailing a belief in a historical utopia that can be reproduced in
contemporary Islam. Both remained uninterested in critical historical inquiry
and responded to the challenge of modernity by escaping to the secure haven of
the text. Both advocated a form of egalitarianism and anti-elitism to the point
that they came to consider intellectualism and rational moral insight to be
inaccessible and, thus, corruptions of the purity of the Islamic message.
Wahhabism and Salafism were beset with contradictions that made them
simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic and infested both creeds (especially in
the 1980s and 1990s) with a kind of supremacist thinking that prevails until
today.
Between
Apologetics and Supremacy
The predominant intellectual response
to the challenge of modernity in Islam has been apologetics. Apologetics
consisted of an effort by a large number of commentators to defend the Islamic
system of beliefs from the onslaught of Orientalism, Westernization and
modernity by simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and supremacy of
Islam. Apologists responded to the intellectual challenges coming from the West
by adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictions
eschewed any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines, and celebrated the
presumed perfection of Islam. A common apologist argument was that any
meritorious or worthwhile modern institution was first invented by Muslims.
According to the apologists, Islam liberated women, created a democracy,
endorsed pluralism, protected human rights and guaranteed social security long
before these institutions ever existed in the West. These concepts were not
asserted out of critical understanding or ideological commitment, but primarily
as a means of resisting Western hegemony and affirming self-worth. The main
effect of apologetics, however, was to contribute to a sense of intellectual
self-sufficiency that often descended into moral arrogance. To the extent that
apologetics were habit-forming, it produced a culture that eschewed
self-critical and introspective insight, and embraced the projection of blame
and a fantasy-like level of confidence.
In many ways, the apologetic
response was fundamentally centered on power. Its main purpose was not to
integrate particular values within Islamic culture, but to empower Islam against
its civilizational rival. Muslim apologetics tended to be opportunistic and
rather unprincipled, and, in fact, they lent support to the tendency among many
intellectuals and activists to give precedence to the logic of pragmatism over
any other competing demands. Invoking the logic of necessity or public interest
to justify courses of action, at the expense of moral imperatives, became common
practice. Effectively, apologists got into the habit of paying homage to the
presumed superiority of the Islamic tradition, but marginalized this idealistic
image in everyday life.
Post-1970s Salafism adopted many
of the premises of the apologetic discourse, but it also took these premises to
their logical extreme. Instead of simple apologetics, Salafism responded to
feelings of powerlessness and defeat with uncompromising and arrogant symbolic
displays of power, not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslim women.
Fundamentally, Salafism, which by the 1970s had become a virulent puritan
theology, further anchored itself in the confident security of texts.
Nonetheless, contrary to the assertions of its proponents, Salafism did not
necessarily pursue objective or balanced interpretations of Islamic texts, but
primarily projected its own frustrations and aspirations upon the text. Its
proponents no longer concerned themselves with coopting or claiming Western
institutions as their own, but defined Islam as the exact antithesis of the
West, under the guise of reclaiming the true and real Islam. Whatever the West
was perceived to be, Islam was understood to be the exact opposite.
Alienation from
Tradition
Of course, neither Wahhabism nor Salafism is represented by some formal
institution. They are theological orientations and not structured schools of
thought. Nevertheless, the lapsing and bonding of the theologies of Wahhabism
and Salafism produced a contemporary orientation that is anchored in profound
feelings of defeat, frustration and alienation, not only from modern
institutions of power, but also from the Islamic heritage and tradition. The
outcome of the apologist, Wahhabi and Salafi legacies is a supremacist
puritanism that compensates for feelings of defeat, disempowerment and
alienation with a distinct sense of self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis
the nondescript "other" -- whether the other is the West,
non-believers in general or even Muslims of a different sect and Muslim women.
In this sense, it is accurate to describe this widespread modern trend as
supremacist, for it sees the world from the perspective of stations of merit and
extreme polarization.
In the wake of the September 11
attacks, several commentators posed the question of whether Islam somehow
encourages violence and terrorism. Some commentators argued that the Islamic
concept of jihad or the notion of the dar al-harb (the abode of war) is to blame
for the contemporary violence. These arguments are anachronistic and Orientalist.
They project Western categories and historical experiences upon a situation that
is very particular and fairly complex. One can easily locate an ethical
discourse within the Islamic tradition that is uncompromisingly hostile to acts
of terrorism. One can also locate a discourse that is tolerant toward the other,
and mindful of the dignity and worth of all human beings. But one must also come
to terms with the fact that supremacist puritanism in contemporary Islam is
dismissive of all moral norms or ethical values, regardless of the identity of
their origins or foundations. The prime and nearly singular concern is power and
its symbols. Somehow, all other values are made subservient.
ENDNOTES
(1) Khaled Abou El Fadl,
"Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim
Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries,"
Journal of Islamic Law and Society 22/1 (1994).
(2) Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The
Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources," The Muslim
World 89 (1999).
(3) Muhammad Amin Ibn 'Abidin,
Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar, vol. VI (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi, 1966), p. 413; Ahmad
al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn, vol. III (Beirut: Dar Ihya'
al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins
and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," Journal of the
American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993).
Copyright © Middle East
Report 221, Winter 2001
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