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THE POVERTY OF
FANATICISM
"The Islamic movement risks ceasing to form an authentic summons to
cultural and spiritual renewal, and existing as little more than a splintered
array of maniacal factions. The prospect of such an appalling and humiliating
end to the story of a religion which once surpassed all others in its capacity
for tolerating debate and dissent is now a real possibility."
By British convert to Islam, Abdal-Hakim Murad.
'Blood is no
argument', as Shakespeare observed. Sadly, Muslim ranks are today swollen
with those who disagree. The World Trade Centre, yesterday's symbol of global
finance, has today become a monument to the failure of global Islam to control
those who believe that the West can be bullied into changing its wayward ways
towards the East. There is no real excuse to hand. It is simply not enough to
clamour, as many have done, about 'chickens coming home to roost', and to
protest that Washington's acquiescence in Israeli policies of ethnic cleansing
is the inevitable generator of such hate. It is of course true - as Shabbir
Akhtar has noted - that powerlessness can corrupt as insistently as does power.
But to comprehend is not to sanction or even to empathize. To take innocent life
to achieve a goal is the hallmark of the most extreme secular utilitarian ethic,
and stands at the opposite pole of the absolute moral constraints required by
religion.
There was a time,
not long ago, when the 'ultras' were few, forming only a tiny wart on the face
of the worldwide attempt to revivify Islam. Sadly, we can no longer enjoy the
luxury of ignoring them. The extreme has broadened, and the middle ground,
giving way, is everywhere dislocated and confused. And this enfeeblement of the
middle ground, was what was enjoined by the Prophetic example, is in turn
accelerated by the opprobrium which the extremists bring not simply upon
themselves, but upon committed Muslims everywhere. For here, as elsewhere, the
preferences of the media work firmly against us. David Koresh could broadcast
his fringe Biblical message from Ranch Apocalypse without the image of
Christianity, or even its Adventist wing, being in any way besmirched. But when
a fringe Islamic group bombs Swedish tourists in Cairo, the muck is instantly
spread over 'militant Muslims' everywhere.
If these things
go on, the Islamic movement will cease to form an authentic summons to cultural
and spiritual renewal, and will exist as little more than a splintered array of
maniacal factions. The prospect of such an appalling and humiliating end to the
story of a religion which once surpassed all others in its capacity for
tolerating debate and dissent is now a real possibility. The entire experience
of Islamic work over the past fifteen years has been one of increasing
radicalization, driven by the perceived failure of the traditional Islamic
institutions and the older Muslim movements to lead the Muslim peoples into the
worthy but so far chimerical promised land of the 'Islamic State.'
If this final
catastrophe is to be averted, the mainstream will have to regain the initiative.
But for this to happen, it must begin by confessing that the radical critique of
moderation has its force. The Islamic movement has so far been remarkably
unsuccessful. We must ask ourselves how it is that a man like Nasser, a butcher,
a failed soldier and a cynical demagogue, could have taken over a country as
pivotal as Egypt, despite the vacuity of his beliefs, while the Muslim
Brotherhood, with its pullulating millions of members, should have failed, and
failed continuously, for six decades. The radical accusation of a failure in
methodology cannot fail to strike home in such a context of dismal and prolonged
inadequacy.
It is in this
context - startlingly, perhaps, but inescapably - that we must present our case
for the revival of the spiritual life within Islam. If it is ever to prosper,
the 'Islamic revival' must be made to see that it is in crisis, and that its
mental resources are proving insufficient to meet contemporary needs. The
response to this must be grounded in an act of collective muhasaba, of
self-examination, in terms that transcend the ideologised neo-Islam of the
revivalists, and return to a more classical and indigenously Muslim dialectic.
Symptomatic of
the disease is the fact that among all the explanations offered for the crisis
of the Islamic movement, the only authentically Muslim interpretation, namely,
that God should not be lending it His support, is conspicuously absent. It is
true that we frequently hear the Quranic verse which states that "God does
not change the condition of a people until they change the condition of their
own selves." [1] But never, it seems, is this principle
intelligently grasped. It is assumed that the sacred text is here doing no more
than to enjoin individual moral reform as a precondition for collective societal
success. Nothing could be more hazardous, however, than to measure such moral
reform against the yardstick of the fiqh without giving concern to
whether the virtues gained have been acquired through conformity (a relatively
simple task), or proceed spontaneously from a genuine realignment of the soul.
The verse is speaking of a spiritual change, specifically, a transformation of
the nafs of the believers - not a moral one. And as the Blessed Prophet
never tired of reminding us, there is little value in outward conformity to the
rules unless this conformity is mirrored and engendered by an authentically
righteous disposition of the heart. 'No-one shall enter the Garden by his
works,' as he expressed it. Meanwhile, the profoundly judgmental and works -
oriented tenor of modern revivalist Islam (we must shun the problematic
buzz-word 'fundamentalism'), fixated on visible manifestations of morality, has
failed to address the underlying question of what revelation is for. For it is
theological nonsense to suggest that God's final concern is with our ability to
conform to a complex set of rules. His concern is rather that we should be
restored, through our labours and His grace, to that state of purity and
equilibrium with which we were born. The rules are a vital means to that end,
and are facilitated by it. But they do not take its place.
To make this
point, the Holy Quran deploys a striking metaphor. In Sura Ibrahim,
verses 24 to 26, we read:
Have you not seen
how God coineth a likeness: a goodly word like a goodly tree, the root whereof
is set firm, its branch in the heaven? It bringeth forth its fruit at every
time, by the leave of its Lord. Thus doth God coin likenesses for men, that
perhaps they may reflect. And the likeness of an evil word is that of an evil
tree that hath been torn up by the root from upon the earth, possessed of no
stability.
According to the
scholars of tafsir (exegesis), the reference here is to the 'words' (kalima)
of faith and unfaith. The former is illustrated as a natural growth, whose
florescence of moral and intellectual achievement is nourished by firm roots,
which in turn denote the basis of faith: the quality of the proofs one has
received, and the certainty and sound awareness of God which alone signify that
one is firmly grounded in the reality of existence. The fruits thus yielded -
the palpable benefits of the religious life - are permanent ('at every time'),
and are not man's own accomplishment, for they only come 'by the leave of its
Lord'. Thus is the sound life of faith. The contrast is then drawn with the only
alternative: kufr, which is not grounded in reality but in illusion, and
is hence 'possessed of no stability'.[2]
This passage,
reminiscent of some of the binary categorisations of human types presented early
on in Surat al-Baqara, precisely encapsulates the relationship
between faith and works, the hierarchy which exists between them, and the
sustainable balance between nourishment and fructition, between taking and
giving, which true faith must maintain.
It is against
this criterion that we must judge the quality of contemporary 'activist' styles
of faith. Is the young 'ultra', with his intense rage which can sometimes render
him liable to nervous disorders, and his fixation on a relatively narrow range
of issues and concerns, really firmly rooted, and fruitful, in the sense
described by this Quranic image?
Let me point to
the answer with an example drawn from my own experience.
I used to know,
quite well, a leader of the radical 'Islamic' group, the Jama'at Islamiya,
at the Egyptian university of Assiut. His name was Hamdi. He grew a luxuriant
beard, was constantly scrubbing his teeth with his miswak, and spent his time
preaching hatred of the Coptic Christians, a number of whom were actually
attacked and beaten up as a result of his khutbas. He had hundreds of
followers; in fact, Assiut today remains a citadel of hardline, Wahhabi-style
activism.
The moral of the
story is that some five years after this acquaintance, providence again brought
me face to face with Shaikh Hamdi. This time, chancing to see him on a Cairo
street, I almost failed to recognise him. The beard was gone. He was in trousers
and a sweater. More astonishing still was that he was walking with a young
Western girl who turned out to be an Australian, whom, as he sheepishly
explained to me, he was intending to marry. I talked to him, and it became clear
that he was no longer even a minimally observant Muslim, no longer prayed, and
that his ambition in life was to leave Egypt, live in Australia, and make money.
What was extraordinary was that his experiences in Islamic activism had made no
impression on him - he was once again the same distracted, ordinary Egyptian
youth he had been before his conversion to 'radical Islam'.
This phenomenon,
which we might label 'salafi burnout', is a recognised feature of many
modern Muslim cultures. An initial enthusiasm, gained usually in one's early
twenties, loses steam some seven to ten years later. Prison and torture - the
frequent lot of the Islamic radical - may serve to prolong commitment, but
ultimately, a majority of these neo-Muslims relapse, seemingly no better or
worse for their experience in the cult-like universe of the salafi mindset.
This ephemerality
of extremist activism should be as suspicious as its content. Authentic Muslim
faith is simply not supposed to be this fragile; as the Qur'an says, its root is
meant to be 'set firm'. One has to conclude that of the two trees depicted in
the Quranic image, salafi extremism resembles the second rather than the first.
After all, the Sahaba were not known for a transient commitment: their devotion
and piety remained incomparably pure until they died.
What attracts
young Muslims to this type of ephemeral but ferocious activism? One does not
have to subscribe to determinist social theories to realise the importance of
the almost universal condition of insecurity which Muslim societies are now
experiencing. The Islamic world is passing through a most devastating period of
transition. A history of economic and scientific change which in Europe took
five hundred years, is, in the Muslim world, being squeezed into a couple of
generations. For instance, only thirty-five years ago the capital of Saudi
Arabia was a cluster of mud huts, as it had been for thousands of years. Today's
Riyadh is a hi-tech megacity of glass towers, Coke machines, and gliding
Cadillacs. This is an extreme case, but to some extent the dislocations of
modernity are common to every Muslim society, excepting, perhaps, a handful of
the most remote tribal peoples.
Such a transition
period, with its centrifugal forces which allow nothing to remain constant,
makes human beings very insecure. They look around for something to hold onto,
that will give them an identity. In our case, that something is usually Islam.
And because they are being propelled into it by this psychic sense of
insecurity, rather than by the more normal processes of conversion and faith,
they lack some of the natural religious virtues, which are acquired by contact
with a continuous tradition, and can never be learnt from a book.
One easily
visualises how this works. A young Arab, part of an oversized family, competing
for scarce jobs, unable to marry because he is poor, perhaps a migrant to a
rapidly expanding city, feels like a man lost in a desert without signposts. One
morning he picks up a copy of Sayyid Qutb from a newsstand, and is 'born-again'
on the spot. This is what he needed: instant certainty, a framework in which to
interpret the landscape before him, to resolve the problems and tensions of his
life, and, even more deliciously, a way of feeling superior and in control. He
joins a group, and, anxious to retain his newfound certainty, accepts the usual
proposition that all the other groups are mistaken.
This, of course,
is not how Muslim religious conversion is supposed to work. It is meant to be a
process of intellectual maturation, triggered by the presence of a very holy
person or place. Tawba, in its traditional form, yields an outlook of joy,
contentment, and a deep affection for others. The modern type of tawba,
however, born of insecurity, often makes Muslims narrow, intolerant, and
exclusivist. Even more noticeably, it produces people whose faith is, despite
its apparent intensity, liable to vanish as suddenly as it came. Deprived of
real nourishment, the activist's soul can only grow hungry and emaciated, until
at last it dies.
THE ACTIVISM
WITHIN
How should we
respond to this disorder? We must begin by remembering what Islam is for. As we
noted earlier, our din is not, ultimately, a manual of rules which, when
meticulously followed, becomes a passport to paradise. Instead, it is a package
of social, intellectual and spiritual technology whose purpose is to cleanse the
human heart. In the Qur'an, the Lord says that on the Day of Judgement, nothing
will be of any use to us, except a sound heart (qalbun salim). [3]
And in a famous hadith, the Prophet, upon whom be blessings and peace, says that
"Verily in
the body there is a piece of flesh. If it is sound, the body is all sound. If
it is corrupt, the body is all corrupt. Verily, it is the heart.
Mindful of this
commandment, under which all the other commandments of Islam are subsumed, and
which alone gives them meaning, the Islamic scholars have worked out a science,
an ilm (science), of analysing the 'states' of the heart, and the methods
of bringing it into this condition of soundness. In the fullness of time, this
science acquired the name tasawwuf, in English 'Sufism' - a traditional
label for what we might nowadays more intelligibly call 'Islamic psychology.'
At this point,
many hackles are raised and well-rehearsed objections voiced. It is vital to
understand that mainstream Sufism is not, and never has been, a doctrinal
system, or a school of thought - a madhhab. It is, instead, a set of
insights and practices which operate within the various Islamic madhhabs;
in other words, it is not a madhhab, it is an ilm. And like most of the
other Islamic ulum, it was not known by name, or in its later developed
form, in the age of the Prophet (upon him be blessings and peace) or his
Companions. This does not make it less legitimate. There are many Islamic
sciences which only took shape many years after the Prophetic age: usul al-fiqh,
for instance, or the innumerable technical disciplines of hadith.
Now this, of
course, leads us into the often misunderstood area of sunna and bid'a,
two notions which are wielded as blunt instruments by many contemporary
activists, but which are often grossly misunderstood. The classic Orientalist
thesis is of course that Islam, as an 'arid Semitic religion', failed to
incorporate mechanisms for its own development, and that it petrified upon the
death of its founder. This, however, is a nonsense rooted in the ethnic
determinism of the nineteenth century historians who had shaped the views of the
early Orientalist synthesizers (Muir, Le Bon, Renan, Caetani). Islam, as the
religion designed for the end of time, has in fact proved itself eminently
adaptable to the rapidly changing conditions which characterise this final and
most 'entropic' stage of history.
What is a bid'a,
according to the classical definitions of Islamic law? We all know the famous
hadith:
Beware of matters
newly begun, for every matter newly begun is innovation, every innovation is
misguidance, and every misguidance is in Hell. [4]
Does this mean that
everything introduced into Islam that was not known to the first generation of
Muslims is to be rejected? The classical ulema do not accept such a literalistic
interpretation.
Let us take a
definition from Imam al-Shafi'i, an authority universally accepted in Sunni
Islam. Imam al-Shafi'i writes:
There are two
kinds of introduced matters (muhdathat). One is that which
contradicts a text of the Qur'an, or the Sunna, or a report from the early
Muslims (athar), or the consensus (ijma') of the
Muslims: this is an 'innovation of misguidance' (bid'at dalala).
The second kind is that which is in itself good and entails no contradiction
of any of these authorities: this is a 'non-reprehensible innovation' (bid'a
ghayr madhmuma). [5]
This basic
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of bid'a is
recognised by the overwhelming majority of classical ulema. Among some, for
instance al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam (one of the half-dozen or so great mujtahids of
Islamic history), innovations fall under the five axiological headings of the
Shari'a: the obligatory (wajib), the recommended (mandub), the
permissible (mubah), the offensive (makruh), and the forbidden (haram).[6]
Under the
category of 'obligatory innovation', Ibn Abd al-Salam gives the following
examples: recording the Qur'an and the laws of Islam in writing at a time when
it was feared that they would be lost, studying Arabic grammar in order to
resolve controversies over the Qur'an, and developing philosophical theology (kalam)
to refute the claims of the Mu'tazilites.
Category two is
'recommended innovation'. Under this heading the ulema list such activities as
building madrasas, writing books on beneficial Islamic subjects, and in-depth
studies of Arabic linguistics.
Category three is
'permissible', or 'neutral innovation', including worldly activities such as
sifting flour, and constructing houses in various styles not known in Medina.
Category four is
the 'reprehensible innovation'. This includes such misdemeanours as
overdecorating mosques or the Qur'an.
Category five is
the 'forbidden innovation'. This includes unlawful taxes, giving judgeships to
those unqualified to hold them, and sectarian beliefs and practices that
explicitly contravene the known principles of the Qur'an and the Sunna.
The above
classification of bid'a types is normal in classical Shari'a literature,
being accepted by the four schools of orthodox fiqh. There have been only
two significant exceptions to this understanding in the history of Islamic
thought: the Zahiri school as articulated by Ibn Hazm, and one wing of the
Hanbali madhhab, represented by Ibn Taymiya, who goes against the classical ijma'
on this issue, and claims that all forms of innovation, good or bad, are
un-Islamic.
Why is it, then,
that so many Muslims now believe that innovation in any form is unacceptable in
Islam? One factor has already been touched on: the mental complexes thrown up by
insecurity, which incline people to find comfort in absolutist and literalist
interpretations. Another lies in the influence of the well-financed neo-Hanbali
madhhab called Wahhabism, whose leaders are famous for their rejection of all
possibility of development.
In any case,
armed with this more sophisticated and classical awareness of Islam's ability to
acknowledge and assimilate novelty, we can understand how Muslim civilisation
was able so quickly to produce novel academic disciplines to deal with new
problems as these arose.
Islamic
psychology is characteristic of the new ulum which, although present in
latent and implicit form in the Quran, were first systematized in Islamic
culture during the early Abbasid period. Given the importance that the Quran
attaches to obtaining a 'sound heart', we are not surprised to find that the
influence of Islamic psychology has been massive and all-pervasive. In the
formative first four centuries of Islam, the time when the great works of tafsir,
hadith, grammar, and so forth were laid down, the ulema also applied their minds
to this problem of al-qalb al-salim. This was first visible when,
following the example of the Tabi'in, many of the early ascetics, such as Sufyan
ibn Uyayna, Sufyan al-Thawri, and Abdallah ibn al-Mubarak, had focussed their
concerns explicitly on the art of purifying the heart. The methods they
recommended were frequent fasting and night prayer, periodic retreats, and a
preoccupation with murabata: service as volunteer fighters in the border
castles of Asia Minor.
This type of
pietist orientation was not in the least systematic during this period. It was a
loose category embracing all Muslims who sought salvation through the Prophetic
virtues of renunciation, sincerity, and deep devotion to the revelation. These
men and women were variously referred to as al-bakka'un: 'the weepers',
because of their fear of the Day of Judgement, or as zuhhad, ascetics, or
ubbad, 'unceasing worshippers'.
By the third
century, however, we start to find writings which can be understood as belonging
to a distinct devotional school. The increasing luxury and materialism of
Abbasid urban society spurred many Muslims to campaign for a restoration of the
simplicity of the Prophetic age. Purity of heart, compassion for others, and a
constant recollection of God were the defining features of this trend. We find
references to the method of muhasaba: self-examination to detect
impurities of intention. Also stressed was riyada: self-discipline.
By this time,
too, the main outlines of Quranic psychology had been worked out. The human
creature, it was realised, was made up of four constituent parts: the body (jism),
the mind (aql), the spirit (ruh), and the self (nafs). The
first two need little comment. Less familiar (at least to people of a modern
education) are the third and fourth categories.
The spirit is the
ruh, that underlying essence of the human individual which survives
death. It is hard to comprehend rationally, being in part of Divine inspiration,
as the Quran says:
"And they ask
you about the spirit; say, the spirit is of the command of my Lord. And you
have been given of knowledge only a little."[7]
According to the
early Islamic psychologists, the ruh is a non-material reality which pervades
the entire human body, but is centred on the heart, the qalb. It
represents that part of man which is not of this world, and which connects him
with his Creator, and which, if he is fortunate, enables him to see God in the
next world. When we are born, this ruh is intact and pure. As we are
initiated into the distractions of the world, however, it is covered over with
the 'rust' (ran) of which the Quran speaks. This rust is made up of two
things: sin and distraction. When, through the process of self-discipline, these
are banished, so that the worshipper is preserved from sin and is focussing
entirely on the immediate presence and reality of God, the rust is dissolved,
and the ruh once again is free. The heart is sound; and salvation, and
closeness to God, are achieved.
This sounds
simple enough. However, the early Muslims taught that such precious things come
only at an appropriate price. Cleaning up the Augean stables of the heart is a
most excruciating challenge. Outward conformity to the rules of religion is
simple enough; but it is only the first step. Much more demanding is the policy
known as mujahada: the daily combat against the lower self, the nafs.
As the Quran says:
'As for him that
fears the standing before his Lord, and forbids his nafs its desires,
for him, Heaven shall be his place of resort.'[8]
Hence the Sufi
commandment:
'Slaughter your
ego with the knives of mujahada.' [9]
Once the nafs
is controlled, then the heart is clear, and the virtues proceed from it easily
and naturally.
Because its
objective is nothing less than salvation, this vital Islamic science has been
consistently expounded by the great scholars of classical Islam. While today
there are many Muslims, influenced by either Wahhabi or Orientalist agendas, who
believe that Sufism has always led a somewhat marginal existence in Islam, the
reality is that the overwhelming majority of the classical scholars were
actively involved in Sufism.
The early Shafi'i
scholars of Khurasan: al-Hakim al-Nisaburi, Ibn Furak, al-Qushayri and al-Bayhaqi,
were all Sufis who formed links in the richest academic tradition of Abbasid
Islam, which culminated in the achievement of Imam Hujjat al-Islam al-Ghazali.
Ghazali himself, author of some three hundred books, including the definitive
rebuttals of Arab philosophy and the Ismailis, three large textbooks of Shafi'i fiqh,
the best-known tract of usul al-fiqh, two works on logic, and several
theological treatises, also left us with the classic statement of orthodox
Sufism: the Ihya Ulum al-Din, a book of which Imam Nawawi remarked:
"Were the
books of Islam all to be lost, excepting only the Ihya', it would
suffice to replace them all." [10]
Imam Nawawi himself
wrote two books which record his debt to Sufism, one called the Bustan al-Arifin
('Garden of the Gnostics', and another called the al-Maqasid
(recently published in English translation, Sunna Books, Evanston Il. trans. Nuh
Ha Mim Keller).
Among the Malikis,
too, Sufism was popular. Al-Sawi, al-Dardir, al-Laqqani and Abd al-Wahhab
al-Baghdadi were all exponents of Sufism. The Maliki jurist of Cairo, Abd al-Wahhab
al-Sha'rani defines Sufism as follows:
'The path of the
Sufis is built on the Quran and the Sunna, and is based on living according to
the morals of the prophets and the purified ones. It may not be blamed, unless
it violates an explicit statement from the Quran, sunna, or ijma. If it
does not contravene any of these sources, then no pretext remains for
condemning it, except one's own low opinion of others, or interpreting what
they do as ostentation, which is unlawful. No-one denies the states of the
Sufis except someone ignorant of the way they are.'[11]
For Hanbali Sufism
one has to look no further than the revered figures of Abdallah Ansari, Abd al-Qadir
al-Jilani, Ibn al-Jawzi, and Ibn Rajab.
In fact,
virtually all the great luminaries of medieval Islam: al-Suyuti, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani,
al-Ayni, Ibn Khaldun, al-Subki, Ibn Hajar al-Haytami; tafsir writers like
Baydawi, al-Sawi, Abu'l-Su'ud, al-Baghawi, and Ibn Kathir[12]
; aqida writers such as Taftazani, al-Nasafi, al-Razi: all wrote in
support of Sufism. Many, indeed, composed independent works of Sufi inspiration.
The ulema of the great dynasties of Islamic history, including the Ottomans and
the Moghuls, were deeply infused with the Sufi outlook, regarding it as one of
the most central and indispensable of Islamic sciences.
Further
confirmation of the Islamic legitimacy of Sufism is supplied by the enthusiasm
of its exponents for carrying Islam beyond the boundaries of the Islamic world.
The Islamization process in India, Black Africa, and South-East Asia was carried
out largely at the hands of wandering Sufi teachers. Likewise, the Islamic
obligation of jihad has been borne with especial zeal by the Sufi orders. All
the great nineteenth century jihadists: Uthman dan Fodio (Hausaland), al-Sanousi
(Libya), Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (Algeria), Imam Shamil (Daghestan) and the
leaders of the Padre Rebellion (Sumatra) were active practitioners of Sufism,
writing extensively on it while on their campaigns. Nothing is further from
reality, in fact, than the claim that Sufism represents a quietist and
non-militant form of Islam.
With all this, we
confront a paradox. Why is it, if Sufism has been so respected a part of Muslim
intellectual and political life throughout our history, that there are,
nowadays, angry voices raised against it? There are two fundamental reasons
here.
Firstly, there is
again the pervasive influence of Orientalist scholarship, which, at least before
1922 when Massignon wrote his Essai sur les origines de la lexique technique,
was of the opinion that something so fertile and profound as Sufism could never
have grown from the essentially 'barren and legalistic' soil of Islam.
Orientalist works translated into Muslim languages were influential upon key
Muslim modernists - such as Muhammad Abduh in his later writings - who began to
question the centrality, or even the legitimacy, of Sufi discourse in Islam.
Secondly, there
is the emergence of the Wahhabi da'wa. When Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,
some two hundred years ago, teamed up with the Saudi tribe and attacked the
neighbouring clans, he was doing so under the sign of an essentially neo-Kharijite
version of Islam. Although he invoked Ibn Taymiya, he had reservations even
about him. For Ibn Taymiya himself, although critical of the excesses of certain
Sufi groups, had been committed to a branch of mainstream Sufism. This is clear,
for instance, in Ibn Taymiya's work Sharh Futuh al-Ghayb, a commentary on
some technical points in the Revelations
of the Unseen, a key work by the sixth-century saint of Baghdad, Abd al-Qadir
al-Jilani. Throughout the work Ibn Taymiya shows himself to be a loyal disciple
of al-Jilani, whom he always refers to as shaykhuna ('our teacher'). This
Qadiri affiliation is confirmed in the later literature of the Qadiri tariqa,
which records Ibn Taymiya as a key link in the silsila, the chain of
transmission of Qadiri teachings.[13]
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab,
however, went far beyond this. Raised in the wastelands of Najd in Central
Arabia, he had little access to mainstream Muslim scholarship. In fact, when his
da'wa appeared and became notorious, the scholars and muftis of the day applied
to it the famous Hadith of Najd:
Ibn Umar reported
the Prophet (upon whom be blessings and peace) as saying: "Oh God, bless
us in our Syria; O God, bless us in our Yemen." Those present said:
"And in our Najd, O Messenger of God!" but he said, "O God,
bless us in our Syria; O God, bless us in our Yemen." Those present said,
"And in our Najd, O Messenger of God!". Ibn Umar said that he
thought that he said on the third occasion: "Earthquakes and dissensions
(fitna) are there, and there shall arise the horn of the devil."[14]
And it is
significant that almost uniquely among the lands of Islam, Najd has never
produced scholars of any repute.
The Najd-based da'wa
of the Wahhabis, however, began to be heard more loudly following the explosion
of Saudi oil wealth. Many, even most, Islamic publishing houses in Cairo and
Beirut are now subsidised by Wahhabi organisations, which prevent them from
publishing traditional works on Sufism, and remove passages in other works
considered unacceptable to Wahhabist doctrine.
The neo-Kharijite
nature of Wahhabism makes it intolerant of all other forms of Islamic
expression. However, because it has no coherent fiqh of its own - it
rejects the orthodox madhhabs - and has only the most basic and primitively
anthropomorphic aqida, it has a fluid, amoebalike tendency to produce
divisions and subdivisions among those who profess it. No longer are the Islamic
groups essentially united by a consistent madhhab and the Ash'ari [or
Maturidi] aqida. Instead, they are all trying to derive the shari'a
and the aqida from the Quran and the Sunna by themselves. The result is
the appalling state of division and conflict which disfigures the modern salafi
condition.
At this critical
moment in our history, the umma has only one realistic hope for survival, and
that is to restore the 'middle way', defined by that sophisticated classical
consensus which was worked out over painful centuries of debate and scholarship.
That consensus alone has the demonstrable ability to provide a basis for unity.
But it can only be retrieved when we improve the state of our hearts, and fill
them with the Islamic virtues of affection, respect, tolerance and
reconciliation. This inner reform, which is the traditional competence of
Sufism, is a precondition for the restoration of unity in the Islamic movement.
The alternative is likely to be continued, and agonising, failure.
British convert to Islam,
Abdal-Hakim Murad, was born in 1960 in London. He was educated Cambridge
University (MA Arabic), and at al-Azhar University, the highest seat of
learning in Sunni Islam. He has studied under traditional Islamic scholars
in Cairo and Jeddah, including Shaykh Ahmad Mashhur al-Haddad, and Shaykh Ismail
al-Adawi. Abdal-Hakim Murad has translated several classical Arabic works,
including Imam al-Bayhaqi's 'Seventy-Seven Branches of Faith', and 'Selections
from the Fath al-Bari'. He is also
the Trustee and Secretary of The Muslim Academic Trust and
Director of The Anglo-Muslim Fellowship for Eastern Europe.
Read other articles by Abdal-Hakim Murad on this site here.
NOTES
1. Sura
13:11.
2. For
a further analysis of this passage, see Habib Ahmad Mashhur al-Haddad, Key
to the Garden (Quilliam
Press, London 1990 CE), 78-81.
3.
Sura 26:89. The archetype is Abrahamic: see Sura 37:84.
4.
This hadith is in fact an instance of takhsis al-amm: a frequent
procedure of usul al-fiqh by which an apparently unqualified statement is
qualified to avoid the contradiction of another necessary principle. See Ahmad
ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, tr. Nuh
Ha Mim Keller (Abu Dhabi, 1991 CE), 907-8 for some further examples.
5.
Ibn Asakir, Tabyin Kadhib al-Muftari (Damascus, 1347), 97.
6.
Cited in Muhammad al-Jurdani, al-Jawahir al-lu'lu'iyya fi sharh al-Arba'in
al-Nawawiya (Damascus, 1328), 220-1.
7.
17:85.
8.
79:40.
9.
al-Qushayri, al-Risala (Cairo, n.d.), I, 393.
10.
al-Zabidi, Ithaf al-sada al-muttaqin (Cairo, 1311), I, 27.
11.
Sha'rani, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra (Cairo, 1374), I, 4.
12.
It is true that Ibn Kathir in his Bidaya is critical of some later
Sufis. Nonetheless, in his Mawlid, which he asked his pupils to recite
on the occasion of the Blessed Prophet's birthday each year, he makes his
personal debt to a conservative and sober Sufism quite clear.
13.
See G. Makdisi's article 'Ibn Taymiyya: A Sufi of the Qadiriya Order' in
the American Journal of Arabic Studies, 1973.
14.
Narrated by Bukhari. The translation is from J. Robson, Mishkat al-Masabih
(Lahore, 1970), II, 1380.
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