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The Status of
Woman in Islamic Law
"The Islamic extremists are imposing
the infallibility of the basic Quranic text on interpretations of the text. In
effect a human interpretation is being made infallible."
English Translation of the Lecture held
by Dr. Jur., Ph.D. Christina Jones on June 14th, 1998 in Göttingen, Germany.
Deutsche
Fassung
Preface
--- Part I --- Part II --- Part
III --- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Preface
My lecture has four parts: The
first part deals with jurisprudential questions. In the second I compare
the position of the woman in the three monotheistic religions. Then I discuss
certain aspects of the position of woman in Tunisian and Egyptian Islamic family
law. Finally in the fourth part I illustrate various points with two court
decisions from Tunisia. What I hope comes across is the complexity of the
position of woman in Islamic law.
Preface --- Part
I --- Part II --- Part III
--- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Part I -
Jurisprudential questions
From the start I want to make
clear that I speak not as an historian, or a linguist, or a philosopher or
theologian, rather as a sociological jurist and lawyer, with practical and
academic experience. This means that I regard Islamic law as I would any
other legal system. A legal approach involves the following: It accords first of
all primacy to the word of the text. The text serves as what is commonly called
the source of the law that is pronounced in the form of a legislature enacted
law or a judgment. If as in many Islamicized countries the legislated law
-- including the constitution -- has in its text a further reference to the
Quranic text, then the Quran is also made part of the legal text which
constitutes the basic tool of the lawyer and jurist.
The emphasis on the text serves
one function. This is to detract from the personality of the person pronouncing
a judgment as the source of the law. Hence, when in reality, however, different
personalities -- whether as academic jurists or as judges, as a university
sheikh ul islam or government appointed mufti as in the case of Egypt --
pronounce different interpretations of the same text, then there is the
possibility that the personality becomes the source of the law, and the text
becomes secondary. This of course worries jurists because this can undermine the
primacy of the text as the source of law. It is believed to be important to keep
the primacy of the text to serve what is thought to be one of the functions of
law, which is to avoid arbitrariness.
This concern is of equal
importance in our European legal systems as in contemporary Islamic legal
systems. So if there arises different interpretations of the text, jurists start
searching for the source of this difference in the hope of eliminating it and
thus eliminating the danger of arbitrariness. The difference they might find
lies in the text itself. It is simply unclear, for example. The difference might
in fact lie in the personality of the legislators or the judges. If the text is
at fault, it will be changed. If the person is at fault, then the legislator or
the judge will be substituted. At this point we see a divergence between the
Islamic legal approach and the so-called secular Euro-approach. While the
Islamic legislature can change the text of the legislated law, and this occurs
in fact, such as amendments to family law codes in Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan,
etc., it cannot change the Quranic text which are named in the legislated law as
supplementary text sources.
From a legal point of view this is
not really a very serious problem. This is because no text that serves as a
source of law is regarded by jurists as a self-contained text in itself. That is
to say, that each text contains references in it to something else outside it.
The reader of the text has to go outside the text to other sources of
information in order to understand what the text means. These other sources are
primarily what we call sociological norms or phenomena, public morality and the
general sense of what constitutes fairness. For example, when the German
constitution refers to the protection of marriage, the courts have used the
religious Christian norms to understand the phenomenon of marriage that exists
outside the text. Marriage is a union rooted in the Christian norm of monogamy,
although the word monogamy is not mentioned in the Constitution. Another example
from British jurisprudence: As 7 sailors shipwrecked at sea and found themselves
in a few days without provisions, they murdered one of their fellow sailors and
ate him in order to stay alive. When rescued they were prosecuted for murder.
The British courts found the sailors guilty. The reason was that this was
morally so outrageous that it warranted punishment, even though the penal law
regulating murder and self-defence had no reference to moral outrage.
Or when we examine the Quranic
text regulating polygamy, we see that there is reference to a psychological
phenomenon, namely, just treatment in relation to the ability of the man to act
equally to all his four wives. On the basis of this reference to the psychology
of husband/wife relationships, the Tunisian executive Bourguiba convinced the
legislature to abolish polygamy. This has also served in other countries such as
Egypt to justify a law whereby the husband is obliged by what is known as Jehan
Sedat's reformist law to at least inform each of his wives that they have
co-wives. Other contemporary jurists have emphasized the references in the same
Quranic text to demographic phenomena, namely, if there are too many women
because of war, for example, then men being in the minority should take on extra
responsibility by marrying more than one wife, just as this was proposed by a
Protestant pastor after the war here in Germany. This demographic reference in
the Quran, as some contemporary jurists point out, can also be taken to imply
that if there comes a time when there is a surplus of men, then the woman will
have to care for more than one man. But if most of the time the demographics are
balanced by and large equally between men and women, then polygamy does not have
to be permitted. On this basis most Islamic countries where the demographics
allow it could follow the example of Tunisia by suspending the man's right to
polygamy until such time that the demographic conditions require otherwise. At
this point I repeat, the above cited examples are given to show that the fact
the Quranic text as a source of law - even when found to be a source of
difference of opinion -- cannot be changed does not pose a legal problem per se.
Now to return to our point above,
that when the source of the difference in opinion lies not in the text itself,
but in the personality of the legislator or judge interpreting the text, then
the person has to be removed and replaced by those who will conform to one
authoritative interpretation of the text. Certainly this is a phenomenon that
happens in any legal system. In the USA as in Germany, when there is a change of
government and there is a vacancy in the constitutional court, the person
selected will reflect the politics of the new government. In the contemporary
Islamic world, I observe that the Islamic extremists are overemphasizing the
difference in personality as the source of difference understandings of the unchangeable
Quranic text even though it is said that they rest solidly on the foundation of
the Quranic text.
A good example of this
overemphasis on the personality of the judge can be found in Egypt. A few years
ago judges under pressure from the Islamic extremists to prove their Muslim
identity and faith were issuing criminal judgments ordering the cutting off of
the hand of a theft on the basis of the Quranic text alone. They ignored the
legislated penal law texts until the Egyptian government reprimanded them and
brought them under control just as they are trying to contain the extremists.
This, from a legal point of view that upholds the primacy of the text and the
references to phenomena outside the text that are necessary to undertake the
hermeneutics of the legal text, is particularly disturbing.
The Islamic extremists are
imposing the infallibility of the basic Quranic text on interpretations of the
text. In effect a human interpretation is being made infallible. This can be
taken as a blasphemy. Only God's Word is infallible, not a human interpretation
of it, as Ibn Malik, the founder the Maliki school of law prevalent in
North Africa, unsuccessfully tried to make clear to the political ruler at the
time. This emphasis on the infallibility of the human interpretation is also
undermining the uniqueness of the Islamic identity , which the extremists
believe they are stressing. They could be said to be emulating the notion of
infallibility propagated by the European Roman Catholic Pope. Preface
--- Part I --- Part II --- Part
III --- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Part II - The
position of woman in the three monotheistic religions
Against this background on
defining a legal approach as emphasis on the primacy of the text, I wish now to
show how the woman has been treated in basic legal texts in the contexts of
Islamic and Euro-Christian law. From the start of its very appearance the
Quranic text has referred explicitly to women and men. While the fourth sura, al
Nisa', is a special tribute to the existence of the particular rights and
obligations of women, this explicit textual reference to women was not
revolutionary. The preceding Judaic Mishnaic interpretations of the Old
Testament text have very explicit references to a woman or a man, such as a
woman having to undergo an ordeal to prove herself innocent of her husband's
suspicions of adultery, so that she could claim compensation from her husband if
he, driven by jealousy, had unreasonable suspicions of her adultery. A woman as
well as a man could vow not to touch strong drink and never to cut their hair
(Numbers). This is in contrast to the New Testament texts after Jesus' death,
which are written more in the spirit of erasing separate sexual identities, e.g.
„There is neither slave nor free, female nor male in Christ“
(Galatians).
This process of erasure was
further enforced by the rise of the religious culture of celibacy that
emphasized placing power and authority in priestly men who subsumed an asexual
character, which in turn subsumed woman into man. Over time in Christianized
Europe the lost identity of the woman came to be reflected also in the legal
texts. For example, in British statutes, the married woman had no property
rights of her own. Her property became that of her husband. This was thought to
be compatible with the biblical text whereby man and woman joined together
become one, and the one was the man.
By the time of the French
Revolution's The Declaration of the Rights of Man, woman was excluded.
She did not exist for purposes of the new human rights text. For this reason
those contemporary Islamic jurists who are proud to point out the
progressiveness of Islamic law vís à vís European law emphasize that
the Quranic text and the juristic interpretations gave Muslim women in principle
economic independence much earlier than the European legal systems by allowing
her to own her property in her own name. Now that the European legal texts have
caught up with the Islamic law on this point, there are now the issues of
equality between men and women. The present legal endorsement of equality is a
logical result of the French and American Revolution's abolition of
discrimination on the basis of social and economic status. The prohibition of
discrimination has been extended to the sexual and attempts to abolish it.
The law has not completely
accepted this approach, especially in certain areas of family law. For example,
the British and German legal systems accept a marriage in which the man and
woman can agree to inequality, i.e. one can choose as an adult perfectly capable
of earning one's own living, to be economically dependent on the other, the
so-called housewife or househusband marriage. In such a case the law provides
for a separation of the types of duties of each partner. Both are not under an
equal obligation to make monetary contributions to the maintenance of the
family. One makes a contribution in kind, that is, cooking, cleaning, rearing
the children. The other makes a contribution in terms of money.
Although the law text does not
explicitly attribute one kind of contribution to one sex, the legislative debate
of the legal text shows that a deliberate choice was made not to require each
partner to make the same kind of contribution in equal measure because the
sociological norm for women had to be preserved. Sociologically it is mainly the
woman who makes her contribution to the maintenance of the family in kind. This
has further consequences for the woman on the larger job market. She is not
taken seriously as a "homemaker" since she is not regarded as the main
breadwinner. Indeed public morality tends to regard a double earner family with
some disapproval.
Preface
--- Part I --- Part II --- Part
III --- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Part III -
Position of woman in Tunisia and Egypt
The Islamic law takes a somewhat
different approach. The Quranic text explicitly separates the duties along
sexual lines. The man is to give the woman a gift, categorized by the jurists as
a dower, mahr. The mahr is in my opinion the basis of the entire Islamic
family law. Once it is accepted by the woman, it is a sign of conclusion of the
marriage contract. It gives her a property right in her own capital. If the
actual payment is not deferred, she may use it any way she wishes, and if she
uses it for making her own business, she may keep the profits for herself. She
is not obliged to contribute to maintain the family. If of a certain social
status, her husband is obliged to pay for a servant to help her. If the payment
of the mahr is deferred, and the husband dies, the mahr is treated as a debt on
the entire estate, so that if large enough it could eat up the estate and no one
of the other heirs, including the children, could in principle inherit anything.
The man by contrast is obliged to pay the woman the mahr, make a monetary
contribution to the maintenance of the family. He is awarded for these one-sided
obligations a double inheritance share -- assuming a dower has not eaten it up.
The man as son or as surviving widower inherits twice that of the daughter or
the surviving widow.
This edifice in which the rights
and duties of the woman are distinguished from those of the man is not unshakable
according to the Quranic text. The text provides not only that the husband is to
make a gift to the wife, but that the wife may remit it if she wishes. It is
referring to a situation that the wife may herself create. This implies that
such a situation could in principle change the chain of complementary duties and
rights based on sex. If she returns the dower to the man so that he may add it
to his monetary contributions to the maintenance of the family, then she has
chosen to place herself on an equal par with her husband, and so it could be
argued that she has obliged herself to help maintain the family and is then
entitled to an equal inheritance share.
Recent changes in the text of the
family code in Tunisia are pointing in this direction. Previously the woman was
not obliged to contribute monetarily to the maintenance of the family. Now with
the reforms she is so obliged. The sociological reasons for this change were the
protests of the men. They were fed up with the discrimination against them. They
felt as inflation increases and salaries decrease that the demands of the
working wife for new dresses and new shoes out of her husband's salary instead
of her own were unfair. The slogan was that the Tunisian woman has not only
equal rights with the man but also equal responsibilities in monetary terms. The
resulting reforms of the law combined with the opinion of public morality that
the mahr should be limited to a symbolic value have now fueled a debate
on whether such a change in the obligations of the woman requires an
interpretation of the inheritance laws that would conform to the situation
foreseen in the Quranic text of a woman foregoing a high mahr.
By way of contrast in Egypt,
especially in Upper Egypt, the mahr is commonly given. It is of market
value, more than symbolic value. It consists of gold, especially jewelry. But
the juridical importance of it to the woman in terms of her right to control it
is lost on her. For her what is to be emphasized in the Quranic text on making
and receiving a gift or remitting a gift is the reference in the text to the act
outside the text of receiving, especially the subjective feelings of the
receiver. What has become important to the woman since the availability of money
from migrants' jobs in the Gulf and Libya are the personal bridal gifts, namely
lingerie, glass goblets, stainless steel trays. The possession of these goods is
symbolic of the onset of womanhood and independence that permits ownership of
luxury goods. This dimension of marriage is relevant only to a completely
feminine world. The trousseau embodies possessions which the woman can claim
solely for herself. Her family and her husband may not take them away.
Gold jewelry is different. It is
not as personal as china and clothes. Gold becomes family property in times of
crisis -- to buy land for the husband, to finance the husband's trip to Saudia
Arabia, to buy a water buffalo, to pay for unexpected medical expenses. Some
women are known to refuse to part with the mahr of gold -- they are
labeled those who refused to sell their gold. With the recent deregulation of
land in Egpyt the pressure on women will grow to remit their gold. The
deregulation will so increase land rents that men are exhausting all means to
buy a small plot, only a fraction of the rented lands they now farm. Thus, the
woman's remittance of her gift of gold to her husband as her contribution to the
family maintenance is, juridically seen, voluntary. Because of its individual
voluntary nature, the act of remittance in Egypt could mean that the family then
is free to agree not to apply the strict inheritance rules and perhaps allow in
individual cases the woman to receive a larger inheritance share recognizing her
assuming an obligation that is ascribed normally exclusively to the husband.
The security of the Upper Egyptian
woman thus lies elsewhere, not in her mahr. It lies rather in endogamous
marriage within the family. A woman marries preferably her cousin. There is
little security for a woman who marries a stranger. Only marriage within the
family assures her fair treatment. The only way to secure relief from an abusive
husband who is a stranger is through the court, but the woman tends to be
reluctant to wash dirty linen in public with a stranger. When the husband is a
stranger the fathers and kin of the woman do not rescue the woman; they feel
they have no leverage with the stranger's family.
In Tunisia in this respect the
situation differs. The Tunisian father's affection for his daughter is
proverbial according to sociological and anthropological studies, regardless of
whether she is married to a stranger or not. He gives more support to his
daughter than his wife in terms of helping her find work whether she is married
or divorced. Women do not have difficulties using the courts. They know they
have the support of their families, and use of the courts is further reinforced
in Tunisia, unlike in Egypt, with a legislated text that requires parties to
register births -- which is important for school registration -- and marriages
and gives to the court exclusive privilege to decide on divorce and custody.
This different attitude -- different from Egypt -- towards the use of courts to
get one's rights under a liberal legislature favouring women is rooted in the
history of bureaucracy in Tunisia. Since Ottoman times Tunisia has enjoyed a
well organized bureacracy which the French Protectorate allowed to further
develop, unlike in Algeria or the British in Egypt. The Tunisian executive and
legislature can guarantee a less restrictive interpretation of Islamic law
regarding women -- such as abolishing polygamy -- because they know they can
rely on the courts, the state prosecutors, and the juridical bureaucracy to
uphold the legal text more or less (less in respect to the highest court because
it is possessed by an older generation that tends to be restrictive in
interpreting the legal text) and to have the judgment enforced as intended by
the legislature and executive. A woman who knows that she too can rely on a
liberal Islamic legal text and executive of the judgment is more likely not to
resist the state obliging her to use courts, unlike her sister, for example, in
Egypt.
Preface
--- Part I --- Part II --- Part
III --- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Part IV - Cases
from Tunisia
I have used the Tunisian and
Egyptian examples to illustrate how the contemporary social and bureaucratic
context affects the Islamic family law regarding women in different ways -- even
though the basic Quranic text remains the same for both countries. Tunisia is a
model of more liberal interpretations of the Islamic legal texts, while Egypt
has more restrictive interpretations. Yet the Tunisian model, guaranteeing equal
rights between women and men, has a uniformizing effect that can have unexpected
consequences.
I illustrate the last point I want
to make with two cases from the mid-90s from Tunisia. They have to do with women
who had not entered into the marriage contract. In one case the woman had lived
several years together with the man and had three children from him who at birth
were registered as the children of the man. He had recognized them as his. The
state prosecutor issued against them both a complaint on the basis of anonymous
information that the woman and man were living together without having
registered their union as a marriage. The Tunisian family code requires
registration of marriage -- the state replaces the traditional two witnesses.
The registration is also needed to uphold the prohibition on polygamy. The code
penalizes anyone who enters into a union with an intent to marry and who does
not register it.
The evidence given in court
revealed that the woman was working as a prostitute. The court found for that
reason that she was not under the authority of the man, meaning that he did not
have exclusive conjugal rights over her, and that she accordingly could have no
intent to marry. Only the man had the intent to marry. Yet they both intended
that their children be treated as children of a marriage. There was no mention
of whether the woman has an equal right to have authority over the sexual
relations of her male partner. The family code's requirement of registration of
a union as marriage was directed originally towards parties who intend to marry
and marry under traditional circumstances but do not register the marriage. The
court in the case at hand extended the scope of the penal provision of the
family code to cover those who live together where it is difficult to determine
if there be a mutual intent to marry.
In the second case I want to
discuss the woman and man again were living together. They were trading
partners, trading in animals (which is not clear). The man then used their
common business profits to buy a plot of land. The woman thought that both would
co-own the land. The man resold it and took all sale proceeds for himself. The
woman sued for her share. She was in turn prosecuted the man for not registering
her living together as marriage. The lower court ordered a fine from both the
woman and the man. But it allowed the woman to get her share of the sale
proceeds. The Ministry of Justice raised objection -- she should as a woman who
was penalized for entering into an illegal "marriage" not benefit in
regard to the land.
The results of these two cases
would have been different in Iran. The woman would have had the chance to bring
evidence of a temporary marriage contract. The customary mahr would have been
fixed by the court and prosecution thus avoided. The temporary marriage contract
is the means by which living together and marriage can be treated equally --
which is even more liberal than here in Germany. The point I want to make here
is that while the Tunisian state is supporting the women's rights movement in
family law it has introduced a uniformized system that does not have the
flexibility for women who wish for whatever reasons to live together with the
man they love. The traditional system such as in Iran -- while not as liberal as
Tunisia -- offers this flexibility for women.
Preface
--- Part I --- Part II --- Part
III --- Part IV --- Conclusion
/ TOP
Conclusion
In conclusion I would like to
leave you with the following proposition: It is possible to use Islamic law in
the interests of women's rights. It is possible to combine the very best for
women from all of the interpretations of the Quranic text. The decision to do
this is political. We lawyers are not political scientists. But we can open new
directions for political decisions.

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